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European economic governance: past, present and future
Dear Rector Magnificus, esteemed colleagues, friends and 
family, 1 
Someone once said (in abridged form): 
“There is a remedy which ... would in a few years make all 
Europe ... free and ... happy. It is to re-create the European family, 
or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure 
under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We 
must build a kind of United States of Europe.”2
The person to have spoken these words was Winston Churchill 
– in Zurich in 1946.
At the end of the Second World War it was clear to many 
Europeans that the cycle of war needed to end. The French 
and Germans had been going to war three times in a hundred 
years and many more times before that. Already during the 
war, the idea emerged to find a way to integrate European 
economies so as to make another war unthinkable.3 Hence, 
with the support of the United States (through the so-called 
Marshall Plan) but also, with the encouragement of Winston 
Churchill of the United Kingdom (UK), European integration 
came about. First in 1949 a human rights organisation was 
created – the Council of Europe – and then, in 1959, the 
European Court of Human Rights. Also, during the 1950s 
three communities were established: the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, 
and the European Economic Community (EEC). Six member 
states4 participated in these three communities, that were soon 
collectively referred to as ‘the European Community’, which 
included the Netherlands and France, but not, right away, the 
United Kingdom.
The next steps in European integration can be summarised as 
follows: with many ups and downs the European Community 
progressed so as to create the European Union (EU). A 
historically important Treaty, signed at Maastricht, entered 
into force in November 1993 – creating the EU that we know 
today, although numerous treaty changes occurred in the 
subsequent years, on each occasion altering its constitutional 
foundation slightly. All this time the EU managed to avoid 
war among its member states even if there still was a cold 
war for decades, which was followed by a vicious civil war in 
Yugoslavia, that broke up that country.  
The EU ‘widened’ (that is, more countries joined; it expanded 
to 28 member states) and ‘deepened’ (meaning more 
‘federalisation’, ‘integration’ or ‘supranational governance’) 
especially in the economic area. In a number of policy areas the 
EU obtained policy-making authority – in EU jargon referred 
to as ‘competence’. One of the flagship achievements of the 
EU was creating the so-called ‘four freedoms’ in the internal 
market: freedom of goods, services, labour, and capital. 
Eventually a subset of countries took away border controls 
through what is known as the ‘Schengen Agreement’. The EU 
also introduced a European citizenship. For two decades the 
EU has had its own single currency, which today is shared by 
19 of the 28 members. Looking back to the end of the Second 
World War, there is no doubt: the EU has come very far. Much 
more integration was achieved than most of the sceptics 
imagined, back in the late 1940s, or in fact more than any other 
region in the world has achieved voluntarily. In recognition 
of this accomplishment, in 2012 the EU won the Nobel 
Peace Prize for advancing the causes of peace, reconciliation, 
democracy and human rights in Europe.5
Whilst all these developments are worth celebrating, the 
enthusiasm for the EU has not always kept up. Critics argued 
that the EU was insufficiently oriented to direct democratic 
representation and that it did not have sufficient avenues 
to listen to its people. In the early 2000s a long process 
emerged that led, in 2004, to the signing by heads of states or 
governments of 25 member states of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. This Treaty notoriously did not get 
ratified because it failed to obtain support from citizens in 
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two national referendums – albeit consultative referendums 
– in two of the founding member states (one of them being 
the Netherlands). 6 It was rather ironic, because contrary to 
earlier treaty changes, which were negotiated behind closed 
doors in ‘intergovernmental conferences’ only, the 2004 Treaty 
was based on numerous working groups, consultations with 
citizens and civil society groups and led to an expansion 
of the legislative authority of the European Parliament. It 
even, for the first time, gave some explicit powers to national 
parliaments, increased efficiency and transparency, and 
enhanced citizens’ participation. Stripped of the state-like 
symbols (flag, anthem, that had featured prominently in the 
Constitutional Treaty7), the Lisbon Treaty8, which closely 
followed the former in terms of substance, is what provides the 
constitutional basis of the EU today. It is worth noting that the 
Dutch and French were not consulted again in a referendum, 
nor were any other citizens, apart from the Irish.9 In fact, the 
Irish first rejected the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and then in 2009 
voted another time following some assurances. Although the 
UK government had been one of the ten member states to 
offer its citizens a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, 
it did not arrange a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Critics 
argue that the Brexit can be traced back to this period.
The global financial crisis served as another reminder of the 
challenges that the EU had to face. With the onset of a major 
sovereign debt crisis, the EU economic architecture showed 
signs of collapse. It became clear that although the currency 
is supranational, its governance is national: the budgets are 
national and most government instruments are national. Thus, 
to try to address the issues brought to the fore by the crisis, 
over a number of years, new institutional structures have been 
devised, which enabled the EU to deal with the immediate 
issues at hand. This period made abundantly clear that the EU 
is still in an in-between state. In this sense the words of Lord 
William Wallace, dating back to 1983, still apply today, namely 
that the EU is ‘Less than a federation. More than a regime.’ 10
To make any changes requires strong support from national 
member state leaders, EU institutions and EU citizens. 
Initially the EU did not seem to be too interested in the role 
of citizens. It took till 1979 for the members of the European 
Parliament to be directly elected, and even still, at that time 
the role of the Members of the European Parliament (or 
MEPs) was predominantly consultative rather than legislative. 
It meant that the voice of the citizens in passing laws was 
at best indirect: it went through the votes of their national 
government ministers, sitting together in the various Councils 
at the EU level, rather than through a citizens’ representative 
in the EP. But over time, the role of the European Parliament 
improved. Also, during the second half of the 1990s and early 
2000s the European Union put together various working 
groups to look at issues surrounding governance and in 2001 
published its white paper on governance.11 With each treaty 
change more attention was given to the role of democratic 
principles and the representation of citizens. The various 
referendums that displayed negative attitudes towards the 
European project led the EU to pause. It was becoming more 
and more difficult to change the constitutional foundation 
of the EU. For each treaty change the member states heads of 
states or governments have to approve, and then the EP and 
national parliaments, and, as I already mentioned, in some 
cases a referendum had to be won.12 
In fact, these developments have left the EU leadership 
scarred: how to deal with changes to the EU governance and 
institutional edifice? How to negotiate a complete package and 
obtain approval by the relevant bodies, if one member state 
(a government and/or parliament and in some case citizens 
speaking out in a referendum) can block it? With a number 
of referendums having been held more than once, both the 
respective member state and the EU can be forgiven to think 
that it then could become a bilateral bargain. Nay-sayers in a 
referendum could embark on ‘strategic voting’ so as to hope 
to get a better deal in the second round. Strong advocates of 
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salient issues can capture the population and rally support for 
opposition. If it happens too often that a referendum result is 
not respected, but used as an opportunity to renegotiate and 
hold another referendum, then one is forgiven for concluding 
that apparently the EU does not accept the outcome of a 
referendum until the desirable answer has been given. It is 
becoming an unworkable way to deal with major change in 
the EU, whether you like the EU or not. It is also one of the 
reasons why the UK is struggling with the outcome of the 2016 
referendum. Offering a second referendum, could be framed 
as ‘not respecting’ the 2016 referendum outcome, and UK 
eurosceptics would label it as ‘undemocratic’.13
At the heart of the challenges that the EU is facing lie questions 
such as, what do we collectively want the EU to do? What 
government structures and policies do we need to support 
these ambitions? Which of the policies and competences 
(powers) could and perhaps should be best developed and 
expanded at the EU level? Which are better dealt with at 
a lower level of government? (This principle is referred to 
as ‘subsidiarity’: that is, that tasks should be executed at 
the level closest to the level that can best take care of their 
resolution).14 In the EU context, using subsidiary as a principle 
with the meaning to curb the powers of the supranational 
level authorities materialised only in the early 1990s, when 
the term became centre stage; it was further promoted in 
response to the first ‘no’ to the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish 
referendum). How can we ensure that good governance 
principles such as democracy, effectiveness and efficiency are 
adhered to? These are some of the questions that my Chair 
asks through a number of projects that I am involved in with 
collaborators and PhD students. 
In the remainder of my inaugural address I hope to provide 
you with some thoughts as to why I think there is a sense of 
urgency around the need for the EU to seize the moment, so 
as to develop further the EU institutional architecture sooner 
rather than later and what challenges we are facing. I will give 
you a bit of my own personal background as to how I ended 
up studying these issues. I will also place these issues in a 
broader context and conclude by introducing to you the kinds 
of research projects that my Chair of European Politics and 
Political Economy explores. 
A Window of Opportunity
Here, at Leiden University, the term just started and there still 
is a palpable sense of excitement among our students and staff 
as they start their new academic year. The European Union is 
experiencing a similar sense of anticipation – although perhaps 
more trepidation – about the start of its new political year, 
which is in many ways very new indeed.
This autumn new leadership takes over in the EU institutions: 
in the European Commission (which also generates numerous 
new persons in high offices) the European Parliament (with 
new and old Members of the European Parliament but all on a 
new mandate), and even soon a new president of the European 
Central Bank. A new mandate with the prospect of having a 
few years in those roles provides these European politicians, 
this time many of them women, with a time horizon of five 
years – which offers a real window of opportunity. There are 
numerous issues to deal with, however.
Brexit
One such major agenda item is to deal with the Brexit15 - the 
United Kingdom leaving the EU. At the time that I finalised 
this text16, it was still officially scheduled to take place at the 
end of next month.17 It may seem surprising that back in the 
spring EU leaders chose the date of 31 October in response to 
the request from the UK for an extension. From the point of 
view of a new European Commission, which takes office on 1 
November, it is perhaps not so strange to want the Brexit file 
closed by the time they start their new jobs. However, picking 
Halloween night inevitably generated a lot of jokes: “Take bat 
control”; “Brexit: Trick or Treat”.18 The appointment of Boris 
Johnson as Prime Minister on 24 July 2019, and his maverick 
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treatment of the Brexit process in the first weeks of his role as 
Prime Minister, indeed left markets, politicians and citizens 
spooked about a possible no-deal, hard-Brexit on 31 October.19 
There is never a dull moment in politics. But the Brexit issue 
in early September already led to a week of unprecedented 
historical challenges to Prime Minister Boris Johnson.20 For 3½ 
years, the Brexit dossier has been one that is difficult to control 
and almost impossible to predict.
So far EU-level politicians and other national leaders have 
been staying out of UK internal politics.21 They are doing so 
not only because it is a domestic affair. Perhaps more: the 
rest of the EU (and probably the UK establishment itself) is 
profoundly unclear as to what the Brits actually want. Be that 
as it may, EU leaders have acted in public as if the Brexit is not 
such a major issue to the rest of the EU (often referred to as the 
EU-27) and maintained a united front. Various leaders have on 
occasion indicated that the EU has other major issues to attend 
to – or so the argument goes.22 These priorities, (formulated 
for the period 2014-2019) by Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker, include perennial issues such as: jobs, growth 
and investment, developing further a deeper and fairer 
economic and monetary union, the (digital) single market 
and the regular internal market, security and justice as well as 
energy security, climate change, migration, global trade issues, 
the future of the world order, making the EU more democratic 
and so on.23 Of course, all these are major issues too, but the 
impact of a Brexit going sideways or the sheer uncertainty of 
the arrangements are still enough to make any national or EU-
level European politician worried. 
Economic governance of the euro area
But let’s assume for a moment that the Brexit situation is not 
going to end up with a hard Brexit on 31 October or drag on 
without further clarity on that day. To put another way: let us 
assume that the Brexit file finds smoother water, and can be 
dealt with by experts, lawyers and technocrats and is no longer 
demanding so much attention. This would be the time for EU 
and member state politicians to deal with another major issue 
(not unrelated to the reason why the UK left the EU): namely 
the future of Europe. I am interested in particular in one aspect 
of it, namely the question of economic governance of the EU 
and relatedly what kind of EU we want.
The situation the EU is facing currently is very exciting because 
of the importance of what professor Klaus Goetz (of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science) and others 
have called ‘political time’24. Any change that the EU wishes 
to make, especially big fix issues (for instance those that could 
necessitate treaty change), requires that a number of factors 
be lined up. From Agenda-Setting theories (for instance we 
know through the work of Sebastiaan Princen) one learns that 
one needs to find the right venues that are the most favourable 
for the issues at stake. 25 In my work with Assem Dandashly 
on euro adoption strategies we identify various domestic 
political factors that play a role in effective decision-making 
on a difficult issue (e.g. lack of imminent elections for leading 
players, strong leadership, salient issues that leadership is 
willing to tackle, and a feeling of urgency or need).26 In other 
words, after sorting out the Brexit file, with new leadership, 
and a good time horizon, this autumn (and for that matter the 
rest of the political year) presents a window of opportunity for 
the EU to deal with a number of these outstanding issues. It is 
to be hoped that the people in leading places seize the moment 
and complete some homework that needs to be done. 
Unfinished business and a personal journey
Let us take a moment to reflect on why I believe there is some 
unfinished business. 
Europe has survived a global financial crisis, but many issues 
have yet to be completed – especially regarding the economic 
and monetary institutional architecture of the EU. Some of it 
has to do with there not being a clear plan; or even if one were 
to argue that there is a plan, it is still incomplete. The European 
Union responded to the euro area crisis with new institutional 
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structures, known as a ‘six pack’, ‘two pack’, ‘fiscal compact’, a 
‘banking union’, a ‘four presidents report’, a ‘five presidents 
report’, a ‘white paper on the future of Europe: five scenarios’ 
and a ‘reflection paper on the deepening of economic and 
monetary union’.27 Yet despite the existence of these many 
pieces of legislation and forward-looking reports, there is still 
a lack of a clear understanding of the actual roadmap. My 
current research seeks to look at the issues surrounding the 
institutional structure of economic and monetary union and 
the trade-offs we face along the way.
Before I go into this matter, let me take this opportunity to give 
you a bit of the history, my own personal journey, as to how I 
became interested in these issues.
In 1989 encouraged by my Master’s thesis supervisor Leo van 
Eerden I read a report of the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid (WRR – in English: Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy) about a possible economic 
and monetary union (EMU) for the European Community.28 
It suggested steps towards the creation of an EMU in Europe. 
My question then and there was to understand why countries 
would give up sovereignty over their monetary policy and 
hand it over to the Community level? It triggered the research 
question for my Master’s thesis that focused on this question 
for the Netherlands. The qualitative research I did for this 
research project included interviewing their European and 
monetary experts from five political parties, the trade unions, 
the employers’ organizations, the Dutch central bank and the 
Dutch ministry of finance. The conclusion of this case study 
of the Netherlands was that this country was no longer using 
the policy space to set its own independent monetary policy. 
Instead, for a decade or more it had been closely following 
German monetary policy. Thus, formalising this arrangement 
was not perceived to be such a big deal. By identifying that the 
cost of EMU (giving up monetary sovereignty) had already 
occurred, there was the potential of capitalising on potential 
benefits. These included, but were not limited to, that the 
Netherlands would be part of setting monetary policy, thereby 
being able to have some influence (even if only small) on 
European level monetary policy-making. In other words, the 
benefits outweighed the costs.29 
Soon after I was contemplating doing a PhD at the European 
University Institute in Florence, I thought to myself that it 
would be unlikely that large member states, such as France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, would have similar 
stances regarding transferring sovereignty to the European 
level. Thus, I decided to build on this pilot study on the 
Netherlands and research perceptions of EMU in these three 
countries – making that my doctoral research. The lessons I 
learnt from those three cases were less straightforward, but not 
altogether different. The French felt themselves in the shadow 
of Germany and were seeking ways to regain control, and 
preferred the EU level rather than challenge Germany head 
on. Germany had just reunified and was trying to find ways 
to optimise its policy within a European context – basically 
to incorporate the Germany institutions and practices at 
the EU level. The UK was perhaps the most remarkable: the 
policy-makers I interviewed were often not even principally 
against joining Europe’s single currency, but it was deemed 
politically not desirable at that time. However, the British 
policy makers were still scarred from their early experience 
with European integration. They wanted to avoid repeating 
the situation of the 1960s, where that country was forced to 
stay on the sideline and had to wait for a decade to join the 
European Community (which eventually only occurred in 
1973). During the 1960s and 1970s much of the EU policies 
were set up to reflect the interests of those six member states 
that made up the Community. When the UK joined they were 
confronted with institutions and policies that were not ideal 
for the UK (such as the way the Common Agricultural Policy 
was set up). When the UK joined they had to arrange for other 
policies to complement the Community policies (such as 
developing regional policies from which they could benefit). 
In the negotiations around EMU the Brits wanted to apply 
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lessons learnt from that earlier episode by taking a real interest 
in the design of EMU. They provided various draft plans, fully 
participated in the discussions, and set up the institutional 
structures so as to shape Europe’s economic and monetary 
edifice as much as possible to their liking, as they might want 
to join one day.30
In the years following I embarked on numerous other projects 
that were not so closely related to Europe’s economic and 
monetary issues. These included for example comparing 
Canada and the EU and examining a number of other policy 
areas (such as social policy, agricultural policy, and foreign 
policy). I also examined the relationship between the EU and 
its neighbours and also how the EU was being perceived by the 
Brics (the new upcoming large nations of world: Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa). Another topic I have kept a 
keen interest in is to understand the nature of governance and 
integration in the EU also from a more theoretical perspective. 
I also took an interest in examining issues of legitimacy, 
accountability and democracy. When the EU enlarged to 25 
members, I wanted to understand why the ten new member 
states that joined in 2004 chose to join the euro area fast 
or slow (a project I am still finalising this autumn). More 
recently my research has been on questions about Europe’s 
economic governance during and in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. The EU has set up ad hoc provisions to deal 
with the problems produced by the sovereign debt crisis. 
But even today, with the crisis formally behind us, and steps 
having been taken to set up new institutional structures, one 
of the questions I am keen to explore, and in doing so I try to 
draw on my earlier insights, is whether the EU is well enough 
prepared for a potential next crisis.
One of the challenges that the euro crisis unearthed is the fact 
that the incomplete integration of the EU led to challenges 
for public finance. The European Central Bank sets monetary 
policy, but budgetary and fiscal policies remain national. 
In a federal state (or in a unitary state for that matter) the 
‘automatic stabilizers’ that kick in in case of a crisis are 
usually also at the same ‘level’. An example of an ‘automatic 
stabilizer’ would be unemployment benefits. If the crisis makes 
people unemployed, the state would provide people with 
unemployment benefits. If one compares this situation with a 
federal state such Canada, the funds that would be given back 
to the citizens in unemployment money, in this regard come 
from the federal level. 31 Furthermore, there are also transfer 
payments from the federal level to those provinces in the 
federation that are not doing so well. In the Canadian context 
this is referred to as transferring funds from the ‘have’ to the 
‘have not’ provinces. In this way provinces that are having a 
good year are providing some funds to other provinces that 
are going through a difficult time. These need not always be 
the same provinces. With the financial crisis in Canada, a 
province such as Ontario that traditionally had been a ‘have’ 
province became a ‘have not’ province (as the automobile 
industry and other such industries suffered greatly during the 
crisis). Ontario benefitted from support from the federal level 
indirectly having other provinces provide support to these 
provinces through a federal system of transfers. However, in 
the EU context the EU level budget is very small, about 1% of 
Gross National Income (GNI) or 2% of the combined national 
budgets of all 28 EU member states.32 In the Canadian context 
there are premiums collected to provide the unemployment 
benefits and pensions. In the EU context, the moment one 
country was suffering from the crisis, there were virtually no 
mechanisms to off-set these negative effects – no so-called 
‘automatic stabilizers’ to speak of. In addition, some effects 
were amplified compared to the period before these countries 
had a single currency. Before EU countries adopted the euro, 
there would have been the opportunity to allow the exchange 
rates to fluctuate and in this way have another automatic 
stabilizers (as people sell the national currency, the currency 
goes down, making it easier to compete in international 
markets). That element is no longer there. In fact, as Professor 
Paul De Grauwe, from the London School of Economics, 
has demonstrated, having the single currency provided these 
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economies that are experiencing difficulties with an even 
more difficult period. Investors can more easily sell the assets, 
denominated in euro, associated with the country in question, 
and instead buy assets in another euro-currency country and 
not even suffer the exchange rate risk, but money is leaving 
the country. In so doing the effect of the downturn is further 
amplified.33 Even though the single currency gives positive 
effects34 for trade and the economy by having a larger market, 
during a downturn the citizens do not experience those effects. 
Citizens then feel the crunch. Many of them are unemployed 
and governments are cutting back expenditure (retrenchment). 
No wonder citizens blame Europe. This is understandable 
because the citizens (and scholars) are unable to assess the 
precise direct and indirect effects of what European integration 
brings them. By contrast, national governments have the larger 
budgets: they deliver the social benefits. Furthermore, because 
the equivalent funds that could be provided at the EU level are 
quite modest (one percent of GNI is not very much) the blame 
can easily be put on the EU level authorities for recommending 
retrenchment. Having said all that, it is perhaps remarkable 
that European citizens still place quite a bit of confidence in 
EU level institutions. At the same time, should one want to 
contemplate setting up the EU (or the Euro Area) more in 
the image of a federal state, that is, further deepen European 
integration, one needs a set up that meets what member states 
and citizens accept, which in turn, is also closely connected to 
trust in institutions.
Support for European integration
With the financial crisis many citizens, particular in those 
countries that were affected most by the eurodebt crisis, were 
increasingly disgruntled by European integration, for some 
of the reasons just mentioned. In their experience, the EU let 
them down and was unable to provide support in a timely 
fashion. Indeed, during the financial crisis more generally 
trust in national governments also declined. The migration 
crisis was another major setback. Many observers, as well as 
increasingly more right-wing and populist political parties, 
have argued that the migration crisis has not been dealt 
with adequately. The response through suggested ‘quotas’ 
seemed to be not thought through adequately. And without 
an EU-system the de facto system in place (first arrival place 
or what is referred to as ‘the Dublin convention’) meant that 
those countries with shores on the Mediterranean would 
end up having to carry the brunt of the first-time response. 
We have heard many stories of hospitality on Greek islands; 
that same ‘Greece’ that itself was going through tremendous 
restructuring, unemployment and economic decline, was also 
asked to respond to the migration crisis. Some of the countries 
of central and Eastern Europe, were also less than pleased with 
the EU response to the migration crisis. 
Recent Eurobarometer surveys show however an increase 
in support for the EU.35 In what follows I will discuss 
Eurobarometer data because it is a very useful source of 
information about European citizens. Yet there are various 
studies (including a recent one by Jelke Bethlehem and Joop 
van Holsteyn) that recommend that one pauses to reflect on 
the limitations of his particular opinion poll.36 Even if taking 
the results of the Eurobarometer with a grain of salt, the 
statistics do provide an indication that the EU has become 
more accepted among EU citizens.37 This insight is also backed 
up by a few other opinion polls conducted in the same time 
window. Some venture to speculate that perhaps the Brexit is 
one reason why the EU citizens have become a bit less critical. 
The Eurobarometer shows that many of the citizens who 
have been polled indicate that they think that the European 
Parliament has grown in importance and many also identify 
the European Parliament as one of the institutions they 
have most trust in. These statistics came out in Spring 2019 
in advance of the EP elections. It was therefore a welcome 
confirmation, even if still somewhat surprising, that the EP 
parliament elections showed the highest voter turn-out in 
twenty years, with more than 50% of the eligible voters turning 
out to vote (an increase of 8 percent compared to the last 
elections).38 One does need to place these results in context: 
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European citizens typically show up in larger numbers in 
national elections, but at least a disturbing downward trend in 
voting turnout at EP elections had been halted. 
The most recent (spring 2019) Eurobarometer shows 
continued trust in the EU, but not necessarily support for all of 
the EU policies.39 It suggests that the EU is trusted more than 
the national government or parliament.40
In terms of democracy, we also notice a marked improvement 
in the public opinion:
Why is all this of relevance? If the EU is to take significant 
steps in improving the institutional architecture of the EU 
in particular in the domain of economic and monetary 
governance, especially given the current backlash of 
eurosceptic and populist extreme-right wing parties, one needs 
to know if there are some fundamentals that support working 
on it. The Eurobarometer finds there to be strong support for 
EMU and the single currency:
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By contrast, as I started off talking about Brexit, the UK 
citizens until Spring 2019 were still much less trusting of the 
EU than other EU citizens:
They also are not as happy about the way the EU democracy 
works (neither are the French and the Greeks, by the way): 
Or the policies of the EU, not liking the euro or EMU:
Or free movement of citizens:
These few Eurobarometer opinion polls provide us some 
insight into the differences among citizens in various EU 
countries in terms of support for EMU and the euro, EU 
institutions, but at the same time give us a moment to pause 
about the opposition in the UK to many EU issues. It provides 
us another insight into why the UK citizens may on the whole 
be more reluctant to remain in the EU but also that there 
might be some room for manoeuvre to consider some changes 
to EU economic and monetary governance. 
A Research Agenda
Following on these insights, let me turn to summing up in the 
last few minutes what I hope to be doing with this Chair. My 
goal is to understand what economic governance implies for 
the EU. I hope to be part of both academic writing as well as 
knowledge utilization (speaking to and learning from actors 
in the policy-making process who deal with these issues in 
practice). In order to do that, we need to tease out further 
what some of the trade-offs are in terms of obtaining (what 
the academic literature has identified as) a more ‘optimal’ 
policy, given the centralised monetary policy and a much more 
decentralised ‘economic’ (fiscal, budgetary, macro-economic) 
policy.41 This question has been around since the onset of 
EMU.42 With the above-mentioned window of opportunity 
opening, one now has the prospect to do some creative 
thinking and see what might be the next steps. This research 
implies delving into whether current economic governance 
systems work; if not, what might be steps to take to improve 
them? What can we do to ensure that citizens do not feel left 
out? In this regard, with a group of scholars we are assessing 
the European Semester.43 To this effect in spring 2019 we held 
a conference in Portugal and are organising a conference in 
Italy later this autumn. We are seeking to understand how the 
interaction works between the EU level and the national level. 
How do Country-Specific Recommendations get received 
and incorporated into domestic policy-making? In a next 
stage we also seek to investigate the perceived legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the European Semester by citizens and 
civil society groups as well as domestic economic actors and 
institutions.
With a few colleagues44 we are also researching the institutional 
structures that were created with the financial crisis.45
There are several other projects that I am involved with, larger 
and smaller but I would not want to bore you with too much 
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shameless self-promotion, so I am happy to discuss those 
projects with you at the reception that will follow, and you can 
of course google that yourself.
The future?
What are the problems that lie ahead? As we enter this 
next stage in European integration, students and scholars 
will increasingly notice that their work will be coloured by 
academic questions and policy implications. For the time I 
am on this Chair I hope I can be involved in both. These are 
challenging times and it is clear to me that no single person 
can understand by him or herself all the intricacies of the 
issues before us. We need a time to engage, both within the 
academy (including our students) but also with policy-makers, 
journalists, and members of civil society and citizens.
A closing word of thanks
Let me take this final moment before we head out, to thank a 
number of persons without whom I would not be here today. 
First of all, let me thank those at the Leiden University who 
made my appointment to this chair possible: Carel Stolker, 
Rector Magnificus and President of Leiden University; 
Professor Hanna Swaab, who was in the role of Dean of 
the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science during my 
appointment; the three members of the Board of the Institute 
of Political Science, Dan Thomas, Maria Spirova, and Joop van 
Holsteyn and the others in the Institute of Political Science and 
the Faculty who make my work here possible. I thank you all 
for having placed your confidence in me, by nominating me 
to this Chair. Many of you have come out today – again my 
thanks. There are many others I would want to thank but who 
are not here. As I sought to express, during the earlier part of 
this inaugural address, a good number of my research projects 
are collaborative. Thus, I have a long list of thanks to current 
and past teams of researchers with whom I have the privilege 
to work. I cannot thank you all by name, but please allow 
me to thank you here collectively. I also want to express my 
gratitude to my earlier supervisors, for without their assistance 
and guidance I would not be here today. My Master’s thesis 
supervisor, Leo van Eerden, is here today. I owe him a debt 
of gratitude for having encouraged me early on to embark 
on this research agenda and to encourage me to do a PhD. 
My supervisors for my PhD dissertation, Susan Strange and 
Roger Morgan, who have both been generous with their time 
during my PhD dissertation including supporting me in doing 
fieldwork and getting involved in the EU institutions early on. 
Susan Strange was even quite instrumental in helping me find 
my first permanent position. They both passed away already 
some time ago and I am sad they were not able to be here to 
witness this moment. My postdoctoral supervisor, Jeremy 
Richardson is still around but far away - in New Zealand. I am 
grateful for his support during my postdoc at the University 
of Essex and, from time to time, providing me with his wise 
counsel. I also wish to thank numerous colleagues from the 
University of Victoria, Canada, who could not be here today, 
but they contributed to the path that led me to stand here 
today. A very special word of thanks to my most immediate 
family for supporting me all along: my mom and dad, my 
partner, Paul Schure, and our four children. Most of the rest 
of the people who are gathered here today are either friends, 
family, colleagues or people I know from my new work here at 
Leiden University. Thank you all for coming out and listening 
to me. Let us now have that drink and a bite to eat.
Thanks for your attention.
Ik heb gezegd.
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